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19 January 1965

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

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State Dept. review completed

19 January 1965

### CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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South Vietnam: The armed forces have won a strong voice in the new cabinet announced yesterday by Premier Huong, but have made some minor concessions.

The military will occupy three ministries in addition to a second deputy premiership held by Major General Nguyen Van Thieu, who will relinquish command of the southernmost military corps. Thieu, acknowledged as a competent officer, probably will supervise pacification activities.

Major General Tran Van "Little" Minh, an experienced staff officer, will head the Armed Forces Ministry, and Brigadier General Linh Quang Vien the Psychological Warfare Ministry, formerly the information ministry. Both appointments are compromise choices after Huong objected to the military's original candidates.

The only military minister to retain his command is Brigadier General Nguyen Cao Ky, the air force chief, who has been appointed to head a new Ministry of Youth and Civil Defense. Flamboyant and ambitious, Ky is already actively maneuvering to try to line up students and Buddhists, possibly as much for his own account as for the government's.

In addition, a new civilian finance minister has been named. The previous man, along with the information minister, was a target of Buddhist attacks.

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Cyprus: No progress has been made toward settlement of the Cyprus dispute.

President Makarios' hopes for a UN General Assembly resolution which would support his demand for self-determination and call upon all states to refrain from any threat or use of force against Cyprus have gone glimmering. The General Assembly's inability to act because of the deadlock over UN financing aside, the Greek Cypriots have failed to get the support they had anticipated from the Afro-Asians and the Soviet bloc.

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The Turkish Cypriots however still do not appear interested in any compromise acceptable to the Greek Cypriots. This attitude has probably been encouraged by Turkish officials in Ankara, who hope that Makarios' failure to get what he wants from the UN will force him to negotiate with the Turkish Government. If such negotiations could be brought about, the Turks apparently would hope to bypass UN mediator Galo Plaza, whom they have come to distrust.

Both the Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish Government seem optimistic that, either in the UN or by other means, the USSR would support the position that Cyprus should be an independent federated republic, with no option for eventual union with Greece. Although there is no other evidence that the USSR has committed itself on this issue, there has been some cooling in relations between the Greek Cypriots and Moscow. In recent speeches, Makarios has not referred to Soviet support as he once did, but has emphasized the aid provided by Greece and has reaffirmed

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his devotion to enosis.

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Panama: Panama's canal negotiators apparently are ready to present a set of demands to the US designed largely to integrate the Canal Zone into the Panamanian economy?

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the Panamanians have finally settled on a "package proposal," to be put forth in discussions they hope to resume this week on treaty relations with the US. They are prepared for prolonged negotiations and feel that Panama will probably get about three fourths of its demands?

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"neutralization" of the Canal Zone, a prime goal of extreme leftists in Panama, will be less of an issue than will such questions as the removal of zonal boundaries and increased Panamanian control of port activities at both ends of the canal?

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